Abstract-In this paper, we propose a taxonomy of privacyrelated information-hiding/disclosure properties in terms of the modal logic of knowledge for multiagent systems. The properties considered here are anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity. Intuitively, anonymity means the property of hiding who performed a certain specific action, privacy hiding what was performed by a certain specific agent, onymity disclosing who performed a certain specific action, and identity disclosing what was performed by a certain specific agent. Building on Halpern and O'Neill's work, we provide formal definitions of these properties and study the logical structure underlying them. In particular, we show that some weak forms of anonymity and privacy are compatible with some weak forms of onymity and identity, respectively. We also discuss relationships between our definitions and existing standard terminology, in particular Pfitzmann and Hansen's consolidated proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The terminology and taxonomy of privacy and related information-hiding properties have attracted much attention. Indeed, a considerable amount of substantial research has been done from various viewpoints [27] , [26] , [16] , [29] . The present paper also treats privacy-related information-hiding properties in information systems and studies the logical structure underlying them. A novel aspect of this paper is that it considers relevant privacy-related informationdisclosure properties as well. Contrasting information hiding with information disclosure logically, the present paper proposes a new taxonomy for them.
The privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties considered in this paper are anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity (Fig. 1) . Intuitively, we can understand anonymity to be the property of hiding who performed a certain specific action, privacy hiding what was performed by a certain specific agent, onymity disclosing who performed a certain specific action, and identity disclosing what was performed by a certain specific agent. For example, if we are unaware of who, say Alice, Bob, or Charlie, has donated a million dollars to an orphanage, then this donation is said to be anonymous. If we come to know that a specific person, say Charlie, has donated, then this donation is onymous.
(to hide who performed)
(to hide what was performed)
anonymity ← "dual" → privacy ↑ ↑ "contrary"
"contrary" ↓ ↓ onymity ← "dual" → identity ( to disclose who performed)
(to disclose what was performed) In other words, these four properties can be related by two intuitive operations-the "dual" and "contrary" operations. The "dual" operation functions horizontally in Fig. 1 and takes the subject/object reversal "dual" by interchanging who with what. In view of this operation, we can say that anonymity and onymity are "dual" for privacy and identity, respectively, and vice versa. On the other hand, the "contrary" operation functions vertically in Fig. 1 and takes the logical "contrary" by interchanging hiding with disclosure. In view of this operation, we can say that anonymity and privacy are contrary to onymity and identity, respectively, and vice versa. If we group anonymity and privacy into the privacy category and onymity and identity into the identity category (or, more generally, the security category), then this duality will provide us with a way of refining each category. The contrary relation may be regarded as representing what we call "tension" or "trade-off" between the privacy and security categories. These intuitions are, however, rather informal and need further elaboration.
The aim of the present paper is to provide a logically solid framework so that all the properties shown in Fig. 1 can be formally treated and the relationship among them clearly and elaborately expressed.
Towards this aim, we build on Halpern and O'Neill's work [13] , which has shown that the modal logic of knowledge (or epistemic logic) for multiagent systems provides a fundamental framework for reasoning about anonymity. We first extend this framework to capture a formal definition of privacy. This has, however, already been done by Mano et al. [24] . More specifically, they have formulated privacy as the dual of anonymity within Halpern and O'Neill's framework and have shown that these two properties can be related by a newly proposed information-hiding property called role interchangeability.
Building on [13] and [24] , we consider in the present paper the logical contraries of anonymity and privacy, thereby giving formal definitions of onymity and identity. We also consider the duality between the obtained onymity and identity properties. Thus, we provide a detailed, formal version of Fig. 1 in terms of the modal logic of knowledge. The results are summarized in Fig. 3 at the end of Sect. VIII.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, to our knowledge, this is a first presentation of a taxonomy that comprehensively covers these four properties. In particular, the formal definitions of privacy, onymity, and identity that we give in Fig. 3 are novel.
Second, our taxonomy also reveals the logical structure underlying these properties, so that it can be used, for example, to consider a formal aspect of "tension" or "tradeoff" between the privacy and security categories mentioned above. Since anonymity and privacy are respectively defined to be contraries to onymity and identity, it is not striking that strong forms of anonymity and privacy are incompatible with strong forms of onymity and identity, respectively. Our detailed taxonomy, however, enables us to consider a more subtle, marginal area between the privacy and security categories. That is, we can show that some weak forms of anonymity and privacy are compatible with some weak forms of onymity and identity, respectively. This means that there is an information system that is both anonymous and onymous in some sense.
Third, our formal taxonomy is simple, due to the fundamental work of Halpern and O'Neill that we are building on, and also quite comprehensive, so that it can serve as a logical "hub" to compare and analyze various previous concepts of privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties. More specifically, various concepts can be paraphrased or interpreted as the appropriate logical formulas or concepts shown in Fig. 3 . In this paper, we are particularly interested in the comparison of our taxonomy and the existing standard terminology of Pfitzmann and Hansen [27] , [26] . One can see that our duality viewpoint is particularly novel and plays an important role in refining the concepts that Pfitzmann and Hansen proposed. In addition, we are also concerned with the relationship between our formulation of onymity/identity and existing fundamental concepts of authentication/non-repudiation. Since onymity is the property of disclosing who, it is easy to see that it is closely related to (personal) authentication. Similarly, identity is closely related to attribute authentication. Non-repudiation can also be formulated naturally in terms of some forms of onymity or identity. We discuss these relations between onymity/identity and authentication/non-repudiation.
Related Work: Formal approaches to privacy-related information-hiding properties go back to the seminal work of Schneider and Sidiropoulos [28] , who proposed the concept of strong anonymity. Since then, this concept has been further developed and elaborated in various frameworks [1] , [22] , [8] , [9] , [2] , [20] , [19] , [21] , [14] . In these studies, properties are formulated in terms of computational languages such as CSP [28] , applied π calculus [1] , [22] , [8] , [9] , [2] , and I/O-automata [20] , [19] , [21] . Another approach, which we call the logical approach here, has also been developed in [31] , [13] , [32] , [12] , [18] , [33] , [3] , [24] , [23] , [5] , where properties are formulated in terms of the modal logic of knowledge for multiagent systems.
The two approaches-computational and logical-have been shown to have some interesting relationships. For example, Halpern and O'Neill showed that strong anonymity can be characterized by a logical counterpart that they defined in the modal logic of knowledge [13] . Mano et al. extended this to show that role interchangeability can be characterized by a computational counterpart that they defined in terms of traces of I/O-automata [24] .
It is also recognized, however, that these two approaches have their own specific merits. The computational approach offers powerful proof methods and practical support tools, as demonstrated by the many successful case studies proving several privacy-related information-hiding properties of quite complex electronic voting protocols [22] , [19] , [21] , [8] , [9] , [2] . In contrast, the primary advantage of the logical approach is that the modal logic of knowledge is so expressive that we can use it to specify a variety of information-hiding properties succinctly. This is why we follow the logical approach in the present paper. The expressive power of the modal logic of knowledge is indispensable for discussing a unified view of privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties.
Organization: This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some technical preliminaries on the modal logic of knowledge for multiagent systems. Building on this logic, we give a formal account of the properties shown in Fig. 1 and also discuss their relationship (Sects. III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII). The obtained taxonomy is used, in Sect. IX, to consider the compatibility of anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity. We can observe that some weak forms of anonymity and privacy are compatible with some weak forms of onymity and identity, respectively. Section X is devoted to discussions of our proposed taxonomy. We first discuss our proposal in relation to the standard terminology that Pfitzmann and Hansen proposed. We also discuss how our formulation of onymity and identity are related to authentication and non-repudiation. Finally, Sect. XI summarizes the results of the paper. Due to space limitations and readability, proofs of propositions, each of which is generally short, are all moved to the Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We briefly review the modal logic of knowledge for multiagent systems. Notions and terminologies are borrowed from [10] , [13] .
A multiagent system consists of n agents with their local states and develops over time. We assume that an agent's local state encapsulates all the information to which the agent has access. Let I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } be the set of n agents. A global state is defined as the tuple (s i1 , . . . , s in ) with all local states from i 1 to i n . A run is a function from time, ranging over the natural numbers, to global states. A point is a pair (r, m) comprising a run r and a time m, and the global state at a point (r, m) is denoted by r(m). The function r x of m is the projection of r(m) to x's component, so that
A system is a set of runs. The set of all points in a system R is denoted by P(R).
In a multiagent system, we can define the knowledge of an agent on the basis of the indistinguishability of the state for the agent. Given a system R and an agent i, let K i (r, m) be the set of points in P(R) that i thinks are possible at (r, m); that is,
We can say that an agent i "knows" φ at a point (r, m) if φ is true at all points in K i (r, m).
The formulas of the modal logic of knowledge are inductively constructed from a set Φ of primitive propositions (such as "the key is k" or "an agent i sent a message m to an agent j"), the usual logical connectives, and a modal operator K i to represent the knowledge of agent i.
The meaning of each formula can be determined when each primitive proposition is given an interpretation. An interpreted system I consists of a pair (R, π) comprising a system R and an interpretation π that maps each point to the truth-value assignment function for Φ for the point. In other words, (π(r, m))(p) ∈ {true, false} for each p ∈ Φ and (r, m) ∈ P(R). Given an interpreted system I = (R, π) and a point (r, m) in R, we define what it means for a formula φ to be true at (r, m) in I by induction on the structure of formulas. Typical cases are as follows:
In addition to K i φ, which means that i knows φ, we also use P i φ as an abbreviation of ¬K i ¬φ, which means that i thinks that φ is possible. We also write I |= φ if (I, r, m) |= φ holds for every point (r, m) in I.
In the rest of the paper, we consider that the set A of actions is also associated with each system. We assume that i, i , j, j , . . . range over agents while a, a , b, b , . . . range over actions. Following [13] , we use primitive propositions of the form θ(i, a), which expresses that "an agent i has performed an action a, or will perform a in the future." Note that the truth value of θ(i, a) depends on the run, but not on the time; that is, if (I, r, m) |= θ(i, a) holds for some m, then (I, r, m ) |= θ(i, a) also holds for every m .
We introduce four additional conditions regarding the truth value of θ(i, a), which will be useful in proving some propositions. We say that an action a is exclusive in the interpreted system I if a is performed by at most one agent in each run, that is,
holds. We also say that an agent i is exclusive in the interpreted system I if i performs at most one action in each run, that is,
Given an agent i ∈ I/{j} and an action a ∈ A, we also say that i performing a is nonsingular if at least one agent other than i and j performs some action, that is,
Here, we use j to denote a special agent called an observer. We also say that a performed by i is nonsingular if at least one action other than a is performed by some agent, that is,
III. ANONYMITY Definition 3.1: An action a performed by an agent i is minimally anonymous with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
Intuitively, minimal anonymity means that, from j's viewpoint, a could not have been performed by i. Definition 3.2: An action a performed by an agent i is anonymous up to an anonymity set I A ⊆ I with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
In particular, an action a performed by an agent i is totally anonymous with respect to j when the same condition holds for I A = I/{j}.
Intuitively, anonymity up to I A means that, from j's viewpoint, a could have been performed by anybody in I A . Taking the cardinality of I A into account straightforwardly, we can also obtain the definition of k-anonymity [13] .
Example 3.1: In [27] , Pfitzmann and Köhntopp defined sender anonymity as the property that (1) a particular message is not linkable to any sender and (2) to a particular sender, no message is linkable. The first part of the definition can be paraphrased in our formalism as follows:
Here, θ(i, send (m)) means that i sends a message m, and I A denotes the set of possible senders.
Proposition 3.1 ( [13] ): Suppose that an action a is exclusive and that an anonymity set I A contains at least three agents. If a performed by an agent i is anonymous up to I A with respect to an agent j, then it is minimally anonymous as well.
IV. ROLE INTERCHANGEABILITY Role interchangeability [24] means that, as far as an agent j is concerned, any two agents could interchange their roles, that is, the actions they performed.
Definition 4.1: A pair (i, a) comprising an agent i and an action a is totally role interchangeable (or simply, role interchangeable) with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
We also say that (I, A) is role interchangeable with respect to an agent j if every pair comprising i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A is role interchangeable with respect to j in I. This is the original definition of role interchangeability in [24] .
Example 4.1: Let I and A respectively be {1, . . . , vmax } and {vote (1) , . . . , vote(cmax )}, where vmax and cmax respectively denote the numbers of voters and candidates. Assume the intended interpretation of θ(i, vote(j)) is that a voter i votes for a candidate j. Then, role interchangeability of (I, A) with respect to an agent k means the following: for any voters i and i and any candidates j and j , if i voted for j and i voted for j , then k thinks that it is possible that i voted for j and i voted for j.
Despite the similarity between role interchangeability and anonymities, they are not equiexpressive [24] . We first observe that we can derive total anonymity and minimal anonymity from role interchangeability by assuming some appropriate conditions. Proposition 4.1 ([24] ): Let I A be the set of agents that perform some action in every run in I, that is, the set {i ∈ I/{j} | I |= a∈A θ(i, a)}. If a pair comprising i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A is role interchangeable with respect to j in I, then a performed by i is anonymous up to I A .
Corollary 4.1 ([24] ): Suppose that every agent in I/{j} performs some action in A in every run in I. If a pair comprising i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A is role interchangeable with respect to j in I, then a performed by i is totally anonymous.
Proposition 4.2 ([24]):
Given i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A, assume that i performing a is nonsingular and that a is exclusive. If the pair comprising i and a is role interchangeable with respect to j in I, then a performed by i is minimally anonymous.
There are two practical merits of role interchangeability. First, role interchangeability has a useful simulation proof method in a certain computational model, as developed in [24] . This enables us to adopt a "hybrid" approach to anonymity verification; the relationship between each specific anonymity property and role interchangeability is proved "logically" in an expressive framework of the modal logic of knowledge, and the role interchangeability itself is proved "computationally" by the simulation proof method, which is capable of being (partially) automated with the assistance of verification tools. Second, from role interchangeability, we can systematically derive the "privacy" property as well as anonymity. In other words, we can establish both anonymity and privacy simultaneously via only one simulation proof of role interchangeability. Indeed, these two merits have been shown to be useful in demonstrating the anonymity and privacy properties of a practical electronic voting protocol called FOO [11] . These remarks are elaborated in the following section.
V. PRIVACY In [24] , Mano et al. considered the operation of taking the subject/object reversal (or agent/action reversal) dual, that is, the operation that replaces I with A and A with I. Applying this duality operation to the anonymity properties given in Sect. III, they obtained the properties that they called privacy.
Definition 5.1: An agent i performing an action a is private up to a privacy set A I ⊆ A with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
In particular, an agent i performing an action a is totally private with respect to j when the same condition holds for
Intuitively, privacy up to A I means that, from j's viewpoint, i could have performed any action in A I . This definition certainly corresponds to our observation that hiding who has performed the action is anonymity while hiding what has been performed by the agent is privacy.
Example 5.1: Recall the definition of sender anonymity by Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [27] given in Example 3.1. The second part of the definition can be paraphrased in our formalism as follows: [11] . The attribution set AS(i) of a voter i for FOO is defined as the set of votes that can possibly be attributed to i. Thus, AS(i) can be regarded as an example of a privacy set. The concept of an attribution set has been extended to the case where more active adversaries are present [17] .
The following is the dual of Proposition 4.1. Note that role interchangeability is equivalent to its dual.
Proposition 5.1 ([24] ): Let A I be the set of actions that is performed by some agent in every run in I, that is, the set {a ∈ A | I |= i∈I/{j} θ(i, a)}. If a pair comprising i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A is role interchangeable with respect to j in I, then i performing a is private up to A I . Besides role interchangeability, minimal anonymity is also equivalent to its dual: Definition 5.2: An agent i performing an action a is minimally private with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
Example 5.4: In [18], Jonker and Pieters formulated
receipt-freeness in terms of what we call minimal privacy. It can be regarded as an extension of vote privacy and has also been commonly sought for electronic voting protocols. This property means that a voter does not gain any information (a receipt) that can be used to prove to a coercer that the voter voted in a certain way. Their definition of weak receiptfreeness can be paraphrased in our formalism as follows:
holds for every run r, time m, and message x that i possesses. Here, the notation r.(i → k : x) is borrowed from [18] and not defined formally here. Intuitively, the definition above means that some minimal privacy property holds even after the current run r is extended by concatenating it with a new global state that indicates that the voter i supplies an arbitrary message (a receipt) x to the coercer k. Actually, they also defined strong receipt-freeness as the conjunction of minimal privacy and privacy up to a certain privacy set A I :
where A I = {vote(j ) | j is a possible candidate}.
The following is the dual of Proposition 3.1, which shows a relationship between minimal privacy and privacy up to A I . In particular, it indicates that the former conjunct occurring in the definition of strong receipt-freeness above turns out to be redundant, provided that certain conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 5.2: Suppose that an agent i is exclusive and that a privacy set A I contains at least two actions. If i performing an action a is private up to A I with respect to an agent j, then it is minimally private as well.
The following also holds, which is the dual of Proposition 4.2:
Proposition 5.3 ( [24] ): Given i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A, assume that a performed by i is nonsingular and that i is exclusive. If the pair comprising i and a is role interchangeable with respect to j in I, then i performing a is minimally private.
Remark 5.2:
Since minimal anonymity is equivalent to its dual, that is, minimal privacy, Proposition 5.3 also indicates that, to derive minimal anonymity from role interchangeability, we can assume the nonsingularity of a and the exclusiveness of i (as described in Proposition 5.3) instead of the nonsingularity of i and the exclusiveness of a (as described in Proposition 4.2).
Example 5.5: Let I and A be the same as those in Example 4.1. Then, the exclusiveness of an action means that no two voters vote for the same candidate, which is quite unnatural as regards normal voting. On the other hand, the exclusiveness of an agent seems to be a much more adequate condition, namely, that a voter does not vote for two candidates. Although this adequacy depends on the interpretation, the example shows that our duality is useful in terms of obtaining appropriate premises for the problem to be solved.
VI. ONYMITY By the "contrary" of a formula of the form θ(i, a) ⇒ Γ, we mean the formula θ(i, a) ⇒ ¬Γ. The hypothesis θ(i, a)
is to be preserved because we want to confine ourselves to consider epistemic properties of runs where i has actually performed a. By taking the contrary of the anonymity properties formulated in Sect. III, we can obtain the definitions of the properties that we call onymity. Definition 6.1: An action a performed by an agent i is maximally onymous with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
Intuitively, maximal onymity means that j knows that i has performed a. This definition corresponds to our observation that onymity generally means that the agent who performs the action is disclosed.
Definition 6.2: An action a performed by an agent i is onymous down from an onymity set I A ⊆ I with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
In particular, an action a performed by an agent i is partially onymous with respect to j when the same condition holds for I A = I/{j}.
Intuitively, onymity down from I A means that, from j's viewpoint, some agent in I A except j itself has not performed a. The following example explains that the definition above also corresponds to our general observation that onymity is the property of disclosing who has performed the action.
Example 6.1: Suppose that a detective j is searching for a criminal, say i, who has committed a homicide a. (As a technical note, a can be regarded as an exclusive action.) Let I A be a set of suspects. Then, onymity down from I A means that there is a suspect i in I A such that the detective j knows that i has not performed a (Fig. 2) . This means that j can narrow the set of suspects down to a substantially smaller one. (This is similar to identification by elimination referred to in [15] .) In other words, who actually committed the homicide is a bit more "disclosed." This contrasts with the idea that anonymity up to I A generally means that j regards the set as being kept large.
Remark 6.1: In their consolidated terminology paper [26] , Pfitzmann and Hansen defined the concept of identifiability as the "negation" of anonymity. The definition accompanies the concept of an identifiability set. We can see that identifiability and identifiability sets are close to onymity and onymity sets in our formulation, respectively.
The following is the contrary of Proposition 3.1: Proposition 6.1: Suppose that an action a is exclusive and that an onymity set I A contains at least three agents. If a performed by an agent i is maximally onymous with respect to an agent j, then it is onymous down from I A as well.
VII. ROLE NONINTERCHANGEABILITY
Since role interchangeability is a quite strong informationhiding property, its contrary becomes a rather weak information-disclosure property.
Definition 7.1: A pair (i, a) of an agent i and an action a is partially role noninterchangeable (or simply, role noninterchangeable) with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if Proposition 7.1: Let I A be the set of agents that perform some action in every run in I, that is, the same set as described in Proposition 4.1. If an action a ∈ A performed by an agent i ∈ I/{j} is onymous down from I A with respect to j in I, then the pair comprising i and a is role noninterchangeable.
Proposition 7.2: Given i ∈ I/{j} and a ∈ A, assume that i performing a is nonsingular and that a is exclusive. If a performed by i is maximally onymous with respect to j in I, then the pair comprising i and a is role noninterchangeable.
VIII. IDENTITY
Either by taking the dual of the onymity properties shown in Sect. VI or by taking the contrary of the privacy properties shown in Sect. V, we can easily obtain the definitions of properties that we call identity. Identity that we define here means the properties of disclosing what the agent does or, in case of the be verb, what the agent is.
Below we only give the definitions and brief explanations of identity properties; relevant propositions can also be shown in a similar way to the propositions in the previous sections.
Definition 8.1: An agent i performing an action a is maximally identified with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
Note that maximal identity is equivalent to its dual, that is, maximal onymity. Definition 8.2: An agent i performing an action a is identified down from an identity set A I ⊆ A with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
In particular, an agent i performing an action a is partially identified with respect to j when the same condition holds for A I = A.
Example 8.1: Consider four attributes-"stomach cancer (S)," "other cancers (O)," "early stage (E)," and "later total role interchangeability 
anonymity ← −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− −"dual"− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− → total privacy
Suppose that a drug seller j is eavesdropping online medical care transactions and making approaches to a sufferer i in order to sell a new drug that is effective only for early-stage stomach cancer without metastasis. Then, the first thing j should do is to narrow the identity set A I for i to a smaller one. (As a technical note, we assume here that i is exclusive.) That is, j's initial goal can be specified as
Remark 8.1: Besides identifiability mentioned in Remark 6.1, Pfitzmann and Hansen [26] also defined the concept of an identity, which we hereafter refer to as PHidentity. They stipulated that a PH-identity is "any subset of attributes of an individual person which sufficiently identifies this individual person within any set of persons." Example 8.1 indicates that each member of A I can be regarded as a PH-identity. That is, our concept of an identity set can be regarded as a set of possible PH-identities. (Actually, they also defined the concept of a partial identity. To be precise, we should say that an identity set can be viewed as a set of possible partial PH-identities.)
The results that have been obtained so far in the present paper are summarized in Fig. 3 , which can be regarded as a detailed, formal version of Fig. 1 .
IX. COMPATIBILITY
Let P 1 and P 2 be any of the anonymity or onymity properties that we have formulated so far. We say that P 1 and P 2 are compatible if there exist an interpreted system I, an action a, and agents i and j such that (1) a performed by i has the property P 1 with respect to j in I, (2) a performed by i has the property P 2 with respect to j in I, and (3) (I, r, m) |= θ(i, a) holds for some r and m. Known results about the compatibility of the six anonymity or onymity properties are summarized in Table I . The compatibility between privacy and identity is similar.
Apparently, P 1 and P 2 are compatible if P 1 implies P 2 .
The six •'s in Table I indicate compatibility of this kind.
For example, role interchangeability and anonymity up to I A are compatible, because Proposition 4.1 guarantees that role interchangeability implies anonymity up to I A if we take I A as the set of agents that perform some action in every run. The three ×'s indicate incompatibility that is trivial by definition. Role interchangeability and role noninterchangeability, for example, are expressed as "contrary" formulas, so that they are never compatible. The three * 's indicate conditional incompatibility. Consider, for example, the case for role interchangeability and onymity down from I A . By Proposition 7.1 and the trivial incompatibility between role interchangeability and role noninterchangeability, role interchangeability and onymity down from I A are incompatible as long as we assume I A is the set of agents that perform some action in every run. Note that they are compatible if we abandon the assumption, that is, if we allow some i ∈ I A 
•: apparent compatibility induced by logical implication.
b ⊕: compatibility in the "marginal" area. c ×: trivial incompatibility by definition. Figure 4 . Minimally anonymous but onymous down from I A system such that i never performs any action in some run.
We can see that some weak forms of anonymity are compatible with some weak forms of onymity.
Claim 9.1: Every pair of properties marked ⊕ in Table I  is a compatible pair. For example, consider the interpreted system described in Fig. 4 . This system consists of four runs and here we assume that (r, m) ∼ j (r , m ) ∼ j (r , m ) ∼ j (r , m ) and I A = {i, i , i }. What primitive propositions are true at each run is also described. In this system, a performed by i is minimally anonymous as well as onymous down from I A with respect to j, and θ(i, a) is true at (r, m).
Another important example of systems that can have multiple properties is an anonymous authentication scheme based on group signatures [6] . In such a scheme, a legitimate agent can be authorized only as a group member, being granted anonymity up to a certain anonymity set, but will be maximally onymous once it is considered illegitimated. This does not provide the compatibility mentioned above, but still can have some "contrary" properties in its different phases.
X. DISCUSSION

A. Comparison with the Work of Pfitzmann and Hansen
One of the main differences between our proposal and the standard terminology proposed by Pfitzmann and Hansen [27] , [26] is the (non)existence of the subject/object reversal duality. By this duality, we can refine anonymity and privacy from the category of privacy-related information-hiding properties. This view of refinement has been explained in Examples 3.1 and 5.1.
Similarly, by this duality, we can also distinguish onymity and identity in the category of identity-related informationdisclosure properties. As Remarks 6.1 and 8.1 show, our concepts of onymity and identity are related to those that Pfitzmann and Hansen defined in their consolidated terminology paper [26] . Specifically, onymity, that is, the disclosure of who, corresponds to identifiability and its dual, identity, means the disclosure of a partial PH-identity. Thus, our duality viewpoint is also helpful in understanding a structure of the identity category.
On the other hand, several important privacy-related properties treated in [27] , [26] have not been discussed in our framework. These include unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, and pseudonymity. A general logical treatment of these properties is important future work.
B. Onymity/Identity versus Authentication/Non-Repudiation
Classification and analysis of real-world examples based on our taxonomy are important. So far, however, our intensive case study of real protocols [24] has only treated anonymity and privacy. With respect to onymity and identity, authentication and non-repudiation protocols will be relevant examples to be discussed.
Indeed, onymity is closely related to (personal) authentication because it is the property of disclosing who. Similarly, identity is closely related to attribute authentication. Consider a set of runs of a certain authentication protocol where i is the initiator and j the responder. Further, suppose that θ(i, says(m)) and θ(j, says(n)) respectively mean that i says an initiating message m and that j says a responding message n. Then, the mutual authentication property of the protocol seems to be expressed as the maximal onymity of the action says(m) performed by i with respect to j and the maximal onymity of the action says(n) performed by j with respect to i.
Non-repudiation can be regarded as a variant of authentication. Non-repudiation of origin (NRO) is the property that protects against the originator's false denial of having sent a specific message, and non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) is the property that protects against the recipient's false denial of having received the specific message. NRO and NRR have been formulated in the literature in the form of maximal onymity, or equivalently, maximal identity. For example, in [34] , [35] , Zhou and Gollmann used a BAN ( [4] , [7] )-like logic, the SVO logic [30] , to specify and verify NRO and NRR of a certain fair non-repudiation protocol. Their specifications of NRO and NRR can be paraphrased, in the form of maximal identity, as respectively. Here, we assume that i, j, and k are respectively the originator, the recipient, and the judge.
The discussion above is intended to explain that our formulation of maximal onymity/identity is closely related to authentication and non-repudiation. This explanation, however, is still informal and needs further elaboration.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel taxonomy of privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties in information systems. Specifically, we have formulated anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity in terms of the modal logic of knowledge for multiagent systems and have investigated their logical relationship. In particular, we have shown that some weak forms of anonymity and privacy are compatible with some weak forms of onymity and identity, respectively. Furthermore, we have discussed relationships between our taxonomy and existing standard terminology. We believe that these results make a contribution to a better understanding of logical foundations for privacy and related concepts.
